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Abstract
Quantum mechanics is more than the derivation of straightforward theorems about vector spaces, Hilbert
spaces and functional analysis. In order to be applicable to experiment and technology, those theorems
need interpretation and meaning. Interpretation is to the formalism what a scaffolding in architecture and
building construction is to the completed building.
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Not long ago, we were sitting in the university cafeteria with a gifted math student. The student
listened to the quantum mechanical problems some condensed matter physicists were working
on. After a while he jumped up and shouted, “but this is merely linear vector space theory!”
He seemed disappointed. At least from a formal point of view, this exclamation appears not to
be totally unreasonable. I often have the chance to observe the astonishment of mathematicians,
for instance group theorists, when I watch them browsing through venerable physics journals.
They point to numbered equations, lemmas, theorems and conjectures. While shaking their heads
disparagingly, they tell me that these results have been known for a long, long time, So, why are
mathematicians working in functional analysis not the “better” quantum physicists?
Recently Christopher Fuchs and Asher Peres seem to argue in a related direction, performing a
nice exercise in “interpretation-bashing” [1], as I would call it. If I interpret them correctly, they
assure that quantum theory is an operationally testable formalism concerned with predictions and
frequency counts which are ultimately based on clicks in detectors, nothing more. Indeed, it is
almost tautologic that the only relevant part of an applicable formalism is the formalism itself.
(Just as any physical system obviously is a perfect copy of itself.) Any emanation of a physical
system can be codified into discrete detectable clicks. The statistical accumulation of such detector
clicks serves as an interface to the quantum probabilities which can be computed according to
algorithmic (“cookbook-like”) rules, no more but no less. This is ultimate testability, and in terms
of predictions, quantum theory has been standing out wonderfully for almost a century now, with
not the faintest indication of failure even in the remotest area of phenemenology.
Any variation of this criticism against interpretation could be heard around the world, year
round and from many prominent physicists. It has become almost fashionable to discredit inter-
pretation. Already Sommerfeld warned his students not to get into these issues, and, as mentioned
by John Clauser [2], not long ago scientists working in that field had to be very careful not to
become discredited as “quacks.” Richard Feynman [3, p. 129] once mentioned the “perpetual
torment that results from [[the question]], ‘But how can it be like that?’ which is a reflection
of uncontrolled but utterly vain desire to see [[quantum mechanics]] in terms of an analogy with
something familiar” and advised his audience, “Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly
avoid it, ‘But how can it be like that?’ because you will get ‘down the drain’, into a blind alley
from which nobody has yet escaped.” Only recently, some of that thinking and experimenting, as a
spin-off, turned into the highly respected and very active research areas of quantum cryptography
and computing.
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Indeed, almost no research field has been plagued with more fruitless “meta” papers and
“voodoo” thoughts than quantum mechanics, many such treatises written by uninformed laymen
with merely superficial working practice of quantum mechanics. Surely, when reading these trea-
tises, one is often reminded of the pressing question of scholasticism how many angels fit on the
top of a needle. Many of these “explanations” simply misinform the public, thereby discrediting
science. Not to mention the more radical “quacks,” who however seem to favor relativity theory
over quantum mechanics for their vain attempts to unfold what appears to them the occult mys-
teries of physics. These people either cannot understand or do not accept the rational scientific
practices and mathematics.
Let us get back to interpretation-bashing. Of course, there exists a “quick and dirty” rebuttal to
the “No-Interpretation” interpretation of quantum mechanics: that it is also an interpretation, after
all! Just as atheism is also a system of belief whose central element is the nonexistence of God.
Nevertheless, the matter is too serious to leave it there. Because, if taken earnestly, the suggestion
to “not interpret quantum mechanics” could severely hamper research in this field.
Abandoning interpretation issues from quantum physics proper amounts to throwing the baby
out with the bath water, and to censorship at worst. Why? Because we would be at a loss in ex-
tending the present knowledge base of physical theory to new phenomenological domains! Stated
pointedly, abandonment of interpretation amounts to imposing restrictions to what is considered
“legal” science. Those stop signs for speculative thinking could be detrimental, crippling the mind
of the geniuses whose precious weird ideas are the root for scientific revolutions and progress. So
often in history the contemporary peers have committed themselves to what appeared to them the
consolidated canon of knowledge, and too often such attempts have turned out to be vain at best
and scientific impediments at worst. Indeed, I believe that the danger of such impediments by
restricting physics proper is higher than the annoyance and distraction caused by useless interpre-
tations.
Interpretation is to the formalism what a scaffolding in architecture and building construction
is to the completed building. Very often the scaffolding has to be erected because it is an indis-
pensable part of the building process. Once the completed building is in place, the scaffolding
is torn down and the opus stands in its own full glory. No need for auxiliary scaffold any more.
But beware of those technicians who claim to be able to erect some of those “international style
skyscrapers” without any poles and planks!
I claim that “soft” interpretation issues very often serve as a guideline or intuition, which is ab-
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solutely necessary for the quantum mechanical research program. Almost by definition, a “good”
interpretation fosters research, while a “bad” one cripples it. Thereby, I would definitely not like
to link interpretation to “reality” or “truth,” but would keep a very pragmatic attitude: as long as
an interpretation, as weird as it may sound, fosters research, it is a “good” one, otherwise it may
just be a waste of time. However, as pointed out by Lakatos [4] so often, the contemporary peers
may not be able to acknowledge what sooner or later will become a progressive research program,
and one is left with the request for tolerance and an openness for new ideas.
Let me give some examples. Often one hears that many researchers in the quantum computation
community profit from the intuition obtained from the Everett interpretation. Other researchers in
quantum theory seem to favor the information aspects of the processes involved, in particular the
reversibility (one-to-oneness) of the unitary time evolution. By and large, my experience is that
there exists as many interpretations of quantum mechanics as there are physicists (the author’s
own fancy can be read in [5]). Even those claiming to cling to the Copenhagen interpretation
have their own very original thoughts about and additions to it (e.g., consider Anton Zeilinger’s
foundational principle for quantum mechanics [6]). Other examples are the pictorial representation
of the formalism, such as Feynman diagrams in the theory of quantized fields, or interferometric
schemes in quantum optics [7].
I would like to suggest a more tolerant attitude towards interpretation also in other areas of
physical research, in particular in relativity theory. The ether interpretation, for example, nowadays
appears to be highly exotic, although it has been taken quite seriously by scientists such as Paul
Dirac [8], John Bell [9] and even Albert Einstein [10], to name but a few.
Without interpretation and intuition, the application of the formalism would be restricted to
automatic proofing, to an “a thousand monkeys typing-away scenario”. A similar hope was ex-
pressed around 1900 by the mathematical formalists, most notably by David Hilbert, who expected
to be able to find a final, finite system of axioms from which all true mathematical theorems could
be deduced by similar methods as recipes in a cookbook. Today we would call such methods
“algorithmic.” It might be a tedious task, but eventually every mathematical theorem would be un-
covered automatically; even Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s last theorem, and also the theorems
by Gleason, Bell and Kochen & Specker, to name but a few. Eventually, Go¨del, Tarski, Turing,
Chaitin and others have put an end to the formalist’s hope for an ultimate, all-encompassing the-
ory of everything in mathematics. Their findings have given way to more realistic possibilities of
constructive proofing.
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Suppose you could program a computer to handle complicated quantum computations by a
very general knowledge base of quantum theory. Would you really believe that any such com-
puter would become a good quantum theorist? My suspicion is that this machine would churn out
zillions of tautologies and correct but unusable expressions. By the time it would start produc-
ing important revelations (if ever), the machine would have developed its intrinsic “meaning” or
“understanding,” its “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. This might be considered as a third,
independent type of test for intelligence, besides the famous Turing test or Daniel Greenberger’s
test of intelligence ([11]; in short: disobedience of superrules, just as in the Genesis).
Of course, by mere brute force, eventually, every automatic, algorithmic method would result
in all possible theoretical expressions. But then, who could filter out the scarce singular important
treasures from the myriads of formulae, the promising technological and experimental applications
from the wasteful repetitions of useless by-products? At least until now, the quantum formalism
does not contain any such meta-formalisms. Presently, this work is done by humans with intuition
and interpretations in their minds. I cannot see any presently existing (meta-)theory or machine
which would be capable of taking away that selection challenge and burden from the scientist.
There is so much creativity required in applying scientific results into practical use that I have no
high hopes for any fast automated solution.
Let me conclude with a partial answer to the question of the title, “What could be more practical
than a good interpretation?” I would argue that proposals of a new theory which can be distin-
guished from quantum mechanics and extends it experimentally would be more exciting than any
new interpretation. Likewise, any unexplained phenomenon which gives a hint to think about new
directions would be most welcomed. At the moment, I am at a loss of seeing any one of these pos-
sibilities (but maybe it is just my ignorance which prevents me from doing this). In the meantime,
let us be tolerant to all those weird interpretations of quantum mechanics out there, since they are
the guarantee for a vivid and abundant scientific research. In doing this, one should not accept
claims of absolute truth of any particular interpretation for two reasons: no interpretation can be
distinguished from other interpretations by operationalizable means, and it may be just a scaffold-
ing, after all! I readily acknowledge that any trickery quantum talk may degenerate to fruitless
speculations. Yet, in view of the mindboggling [7], incomprehensiveness [3, p. 129] of quantum
mechanics, any outright negation of interpretation may amount to a mistake mentioned already
in Democritus of Abdera’s fragments (translated by Cyril Bailey [12] cited by Erwin Schro¨dinger
[13, p. 87]), in which the senses, when attacked by reason, say, “· · · from us you are taking the
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evidence by which you would overthrow us? Your victory is your fall.”
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